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Innovations in 19th-century military technology mostly came from nonmilitary sources. That made the flood of new or improved arms hard to control or direct. Military planners did not so much ignore the problems as misjudge their magnitude.7
Certainly, some observers outside as well as within the armed forces foresaw what technological innovation might mean at several levels of military concern. As early as the 1860s, for instance, Frederick Engels had published shrewd comments on the potential tactical implications of rifled cannon and small arms.8 By century's end, the outline of still wider ramifications had emerged. Inevitably, change demanded and promoted more change, concluded Cornelis de Witt Willcox, a career officer and turn-of-the-century instructor at West Point: organizational innovations like the general staff allowed growing armies to be controlled; production innovations like interchangeable parts manufacturing allowed them to be equipped; communications innovations like railroad and telegraph allowed them to be supplied and directed.9 None of this need be construed as technological determinism: new weapons are products as well as causes of social change.'? Further- Military education was one of the areas transformed during the 19th century, in both subject and method. Soldiering had begun as a craft. Like all crafts, it passed such skills as weapon-handling to novice practitioners through the example of elders and on-the-job training. During the early modern military revolution, these "skills were divided, simplified, rationalized, and systematized to be taught routinely, quickly, and efficiently."'2 Standardized techniques for imparting basic skills spread to all armed forces.'3 Proving widely adaptable, they could be extended to less obviously military areas within armies, training cooks, for instance, or radio repairers.'4 Nor were they limited to strictly military contexts. Though probably not the cause, profound and rapid social change nonetheless strongly colored the professionalization of armed forces, like other corporate groups during the 19th century. Radical change justified concomitant claims to special expertise. Elaborating esoteric bodies of knowledge and technique then allowed practitioners to limit access to the field. Codified and abstracted knowledge channeled the entry of candidates properly trained and indoctrinated. During the 19th century many fields shifted from apprentice and other on-thejob methods of training new members toward school or other more formal and abstract means of transmitting and perpetuating professional culture.3' But special knowledge, special skill, and restricted numbers only counted if a group could claim to serve higher social purposes. Promoting that claim was the key to professionalization. Only when society accepted professional training and competence as socially needed and wanted could the newly defined corporate group claim special social privilege, which was, of course, the whole point.32
Professionalizing groups all sought to make special schooling a prerequisite for professional entry, bureaucratic office, or masculine privilege. Armed forces, however, were not merely one more instance of a widespread 19th-century phenomenon. Military institutions regularly pioneered the techniques of discipline, order, and privilege that other social institutions adopted. 
